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OP THE STATE OF UTAH

DORIS C.
Plaintiff-Respondent,
Case

vs.

18991

E. PUCKER,
Defendant-Appellant.

APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF

Appeal from Judgment and Decree and the adverse
ruling on Appellant's Motion to set aside judgment
on the Fourth Judicial District
in and for Utah County
Honorable George E. Ballif, Judge

W. ANDREW MCCULLOUGH
MCCULLOUGH, JONES & JENSEN
930 South State Street Suite 10
Orem, Utah 84057

VERNON F. ROMNEY
MCCULLOUGH, JONES & JENSEN
930 South State Street Suite 10
Orem, Utah 84057
PICHARD L.
l\PXFIELD & Gi\J<JMON
60 East 100 South
Provo, rJtah 84601
Attorney for Respondent

Attorneys for Appellant
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THE

COURT CF TEE
STP.TE OF UTAH

QOP!S C. RUCKEP,
Plaintiff-Resp0ndent,
Case No. 18991

l/S.

DflLE E. RUCK ER,
Defendant-Appellant.

APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF
ARGUMENT
POINT I
CASES CITED IN POINT I OF RESPONDEENT'S BRIEF ARE DISTINGUISHABLE FROM THE PRESENT CASE AND SHOULD NOT BE RELIED ON AS
PRECEDENTS IN THE INSTANT MATTER.
Respondent attempts to show that Appellant is invoking Rule
60(bl without reguisite good faith and clean hands.

Arcpellant cites
S2

(1962)

for

vs. Chrysler, 303 P.2d 951, 14 Utah 2d

the definition of "good faith and clean hands";

tQr ren vs, Dixon Ranch Co_._,
chc
r

260 P.2d 741,

123 Utah 416 (1953),

for

proposition that equitable issues also come into play in

1
e<jr;1r1y

Pule 60(b)

513 P.2d 429,
1 ,J

To do this

issues;

and AirJs.&m-1D.tfilJJJQ.]JJ}tain Inc. vs.

30 Utah 2nd 65 (1973) to show that Appellant

not use due d i 1 i gen c e.

Respondent's cases are distinguishable

1

present

case.

Responoent relies on l:lu:.;L§ler,

fur

the cier:iniri,r

"bad faith ano unclean hanos" when seek inc; relief under Pt.:ie
She

then

c 1 a i ms

that

the

instant case

is

s i mi l a r

01;

to Ul.:L!ilu.

However the Chrvsler case is net on point in the fc·llcwins fdtic.·
In that case,

la rs.

Appellant Chrysler

a ciivorce act,c·

in Utah.

In the instant action Appellant husbano is,

has been,

the Defendant:

anci Glw 2

·0

P.fter l'.ppellant Chrysler initiateci his divorce proceccir·c,, nE
was served with an Order to Show Cause by his wife.
to

Nevaoa,

ings there.

established

residency,

and

He then fleci

init:iateo divcrce

In the instant action, Appellant has never f'.ed thE

state to avoic service, nor has he attempted to establisr re,idency in another state so as to initiate a civorce

ir.'

foreign jurisdiction.
In Chrysler,

the Utah Supreme Court stated:

"When he found a contest there, <Utah> he fled fron' it
and has tried by devious conduct to circumvent the
effects of the action he cornmenceo, ano to defeat the
jurisdiction of the Court from which he now seeks
consideration." 303 P.2d at 997
l'.ppellant Rucker has never tried tc ciefe2t the jur iEciict ic·n of tr•·
Court.
At the h e a r i n g u p o n t h e r1, o t i on t o s e t

asi

e t h e J u ci g n

neither Jl.ppellant Chrysler nor his tlevacia actorney 2pr,carec
cross-examination upon

the facts alleged

2

in their Aff

E

r.t.

''rr d.cu 1;h tl:r_ trial J<JC1r3e deni<=d the Moticn on the basis of tr:e
r:f) 1,'.

1 ns

r:'Gdc,

that

f1E.

2iU• ''Y setting
''.ction,

shculci

show

his sood

the Yevaca civorce and then filing e.nother

Cc:..:rt

',:cclC cr,tcrtc:ir-,

it.

Chrysler, hc11ever, spurnec

:hL Ccurt's suggEsticn and elected tc stand upon the Order cenying
the t!otion anc tc attack it by taking an appeal.

case,

In the instant

Appellant appeared in perscn at his Motion to set aside

Judgment,

and never sho1;ed bad faith by filing a foreign divcrce

actic'n.
The Chrysler Court stated that a prirre requisite precedent to
sranting Rule 60 (bl

relief is that the movant demonstrate that he

es be for e the co u r t w i th c le an hands and in. g o o d fa it h.

Th a t

Court then reviewec Appellant Chrysler's actions e.nd declared that
his conduct fell outside the bounds of good faith.

Appellant

Rucker en the ether hand simply relied on information from two
different officers cf the Court.
Respondent makes much of an alleged g2r turning off incident
ir,

trying

to

establish

Respondent's Brief)
attempt.

Appellant's

hands.

(Page

6

Two points are to be made concerning this

first being that this allegation has never been

ir. 2n'/ 2dversi2l hei:ring.
-:nt

unclean

It is a self-interested state-

truth of which has never been proved.

Secondly, tte

tas absclutel; nothing to do with the clean hands
''''c'tr inc cc:poused in Rule 60 (b).
l2nt

in

It C!ces not show bad faith by

requesting reliEf under Pule 60 (b).

3

R e s p o n oe n t

0

1s o

re a k c :.;

,- ! '

<

f

hc r

<: th·

kno ,·:leCse ccncerning
1

<;c112ver,

l\_ppellont

the Respondent

has never

teen
has

rad

steadfastly

proven

in

der.ied

that

t e

=t

i

" '..

tr i : '

r:r'h'

q·r·- '.

tt'r

tc crcs=-=

in an adversarial scttin:,

serving
Appellant

1·1 o r n

any

nor

have

thc=c

adversarial

he

kne1;,

has

fie•

affidavits and ether material in support of ttet deniEl.
Respondent would also have this Court tclicve that
Dixon Ranch Co,,.§JJ.l2-1..Q,

tc quiet

title.

On

is directl:· en pcir.t.

May

26,

1951,

'!'t.:it suit

\lC.2

11.[lpellant l\.rnold '.:'i;'.cr, ""

served '.vith prcc2ss individually and as a Directer and 'C'r·Jster, cf
the Dixon P.anch Cor..pany.

r:e failec1 tc ans11er or notify thE stcc'..

hole'ers cf the pencing suit,

and a c'ef.c;ult v;as entered a<Jainst hin·

and the corr.p;:ir.y on July 11.

l'.ppellant Pciul Dixon, anothe· stoc'

holder

first

received

notice

cf

the

litisation

on ;\ugu=t l',

through publication of summons upcn another Defendant.

h

th€'

employed counsel and filed an Answer and Counterclaim on Septerter

13, sixty-four days after default had been entered.

In the

case, the Director and Trustee was served with process and faile6
to notify the other stcckholders.

In the rncsent case /\,ppell: ·

states ir. his sworn /\_fficiavit that he r.ever received nctice cf u.'
change in trial dates.
four days after default had been entered.

Ir the present casE

Appellant movec the Court to set asicc tr.c cccrcc tcr.
it had been rendered.

4

l./e:;r,r,r6ent
le
1,,tr_:

wh<cr. oecic:inc; Pule 60 (b) issues.

ti.cii:

c, f I , r <J F f' r t

r. l'

'·

a'
t' i

ri

that 'c0rrcn propounds that equities come

it wa::;
'/

j'

inequitoble fer

i'.ppellant agrees anC:

the 101,,1er court to deprive him

J u C: i c i a l d e c r c e vi h e n , th r o u s h n o f a u 1 t

o f h i s o I'm ,

c t p r es en t an a wa c: u n a b 1 e to defend h i s i n t e r est s in co u r t •

na l 1y ,

P e s pond e n t

re1i es

on

,

.fill!U.£ ,

t o sh o w th a t

Appellant aid not use due diligence in ascertaining when his trial

ca t e

I n th "' t c a s e t he C o u r t r u 1 e d th a t t h e De f e n d a n t s h o u l

11 a s •

a

n'"Je Deen responsible for getting in touch with his attorney, and
nis failure to do so did not show reasonable diligence.
vesent

case i'.ppellant contacted

tnld hin

In the

two different attorneys who both

his court elate was on January 5,

1983.

claims

thrC'ic;h sworn testimony and knowledge that ''ppellant knew of the
nc11 C•iurt date;

yet Appellant's sworn /1.ffidavit states that he

never received such notice,

and that he did not know of the new

court

CONCLCSIOt
!n the Chrysler case the totality of Appellant's action showed
12ck

of

good

faith

and

clean

hands.

In

the

ir.stant

case,

,,[Jpel !ant relied on two attorneys' stater.',ents as tc when his court
,J,uc

IH>ulc be.

In

the Director and Trustee of a company

service of process ar.d failed to act,
1

In the instant case, Appellant

•·ero of the in11,enoiri9 action.

r2tEc

er notify the stock

in a sworn Affiaavit that he never received notice of the
court dates.

Appellant also pleads equity in that his

5

property has been token f rc-r: h i:11 1-1 i tl1• ut an "! l'ut tun i ty to t.c ,,,
in

the matter.

d i 1 i gen c e a cc o r ci i n CJ t o the 11.i..Lk.s:: .ID , s ta n d a r

i n t ha t h 0 c n n t .. ,

1.

two different attorneys to ascertain his rcurt ciate.

/'

Anorew

Vernon F. Romney
Attorneys for Appellant
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